

FAMILIES OF NATIONS, VICTIMISATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PAUL A. NORRIS*

School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh

ABSTRACT

Comparing and classifying OECD member states has provided a fruitful avenue for public policy research over many years (see for instance Espying-Andersen, 1990; Castles, 1998). The enhanced coverage of ICVS-5 means that for the first time comparable data relating to victimisation are available for those countries which have formed the mainstay of comparative research in other areas of public policy. There is strong reason to believe that the historical, political and cultural issues which it is argued have influenced the development of welfare states may also help explain variations in criminal justice outcomes across industrialised democracies (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Norris, 2007). Following the methodology of recent work in the comparative analysis of welfare systems (Obinger and Wagschal, 2001; Powell and Barrientos, 2004) this paper will consider country level victimisation rates from ICVS-5, using clustering techniques to identify groups of nations which exhibit similar levels and patterns of victimisation. It is argued that the clusters of nations present in the ICVS data reflect those found in other areas of social policy. Brief consideration is also given to how the application of typologies from social policy may suggest new questions, and provide new insights, to the study of comparative criminology.

Keywords: ICVS — cluster analysis — typology — Families of Nations

INTRODUCTION

The comparing of countries in an attempt to understand how variations in social, cultural and political factors may influence criminal justice issues has a long history in criminology (for instance, Krahn *et al.*, 1986; Lynch, 1993; Sparks and Newburn, 2004; Van Wilsem, 2004). More recently, the increase in data which are comparable between jurisdictions has been accompanied by a growth in attempts to construct typologies (for instance, Eisner, 2002; Smit *et al.*, 2008). Despite this increased interest, the use of typologies within comparative criminology appears underdeveloped compared to research in other areas of comparative social policy.

Since the seminal work of Esping-Andersen (1990) the development and interpretation of typologies has played an increasingly large part in comparative studies of welfare (Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Many of the typologies developed

* Dr Paul Norris is Lecturer in Social Policy, University of Edinburgh, School of Social and Political Science, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15a George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD (p.norris@ed.ac.uk)

within social policy have focused on specific policy areas. One notable exception to this is the Families of Nations typology outlined by Castles (1998). The logic of the Families of Nations approach is that social and policy outcomes within a country are derived from 'affinities of decent, imperial ties, common legal or religious cultures, diffusion and ... membership of political and economic unions' (Castles and Obinger, 2008: p. 324).

This article employs hierarchical cluster analysis and considers data collected as part of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). It is argued that those groups of countries suggested by Castles to explain differences in welfare policy also appear to reflect differences between nations in terms of attitudes towards crime and justice as well as levels of victimisation. Two brief illustrations are provided to show how the use of typologies may help address research questions within comparative criminology. Firstly, the results of the cluster analysis are used to show how while England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal systems the differences between them, in terms of attitudes and victimisation, are relatively small when compared to differences between other jurisdictions. Secondly, consideration will be given to whether the argument that the United States may be considered exceptional with regards to crime and justice can, at least to some extent, be attributed to the choice of countries with which it is commonly compared.

THE WORTH OF TYPOLOGIES IN CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

The worth of typologies within social science is an area of widespread debate (Weber, 1978; Cousins, 2005; Arts and Gelissen, 2002). It is argued that typologies, especially those derived inductively from data, run the risk of being essentially descriptive and offering little in terms of understanding as to why outcomes vary.

In many ways, the usefulness of typologies within cross-national research is inversely related to the maturity of existing research (Arts and Gelissen, 2002: p. 140). In more developed research areas it may be expected that researchers will be concerned with attempting to unpick causal explanations which underpin differences between cases, rather than attempting to merely identify patterns of outcomes across cases. The data available to researchers wishing to undertake comparative work within criminology is often limited due to differences in how concepts are defined and measured across countries. This lack of comparable data would appear to have held back research and has often caused that analysis which has been undertaken to concentrate on a small range of indicators. For instance, homicide has commonly been used as an indicator of crime levels in comparative studies as its recording is believed to be less susceptible to biases caused by differences between criminal justice systems.

Cousins (2005) and Arts and Gelissen (2002) argue that it is important that typologies are not considered an end in themselves but are instead seen as a stepping stone to explanation. Thus, discovering clusters of countries which appear to exhibit similar outcomes is only of use if those groupings provide an insight into the factors which may have caused these outcomes to occur. As Esping-Andersen (1997: p. 179) has argued 'the point of generalisation [as occurs when countries are clustered together] is economy of explanation — to be able to see the forest rather than the myriad of unique trees'. In terms of criminology, if groups of nations which share similar victimisation levels or attitudes are identified the question becomes what other commonalities exist between these countries which could explain the similarities in the criminal justice sphere. Therefore, the decision to base this work on a well developed existing typology would appear helpful. The clusters of countries which are argued to exist within the Families of Nations typology are based on long-standing social, economic and political characteristics. If similar groupings are present with reference to crime and justice then it could be argued that these patterns could be related to the factors on which the original typology is based.

If, as Esping-Andersen argues, typologies should provide useful generalisations of the real world, then it is important that any clusters identified provide a reliable representation of the concepts they purport to represent. Any typology developed will therefore be most useful if those countries which cluster together are relatively homogeneous while the differences between clusters are clear cut. If the countries within clusters are highly diverse or it is difficult to distinguish between the clusters identified, then the typology is likely to be of limited use for developing explanation.

THE USE OF TYPOLOGIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY

Grouping together countries is often used as one approach to try and overcome concern about the reliability of comparisons between individual countries, and as a means of highlighting the most salient patterns within the data (Newman and Howard, 1999: pp. 12–13).

Previous research involving ICVS data has often seen countries classified into broad categories which reflect geography and levels of economic development (for instance, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the New World). This classification reflects a broader pattern within comparative criminology, with many groupings of nations being based on geographic proximity. Neighbouring countries are often similar in terms of socio-economic issues. As these factors have been found to be important drivers for crime and criminal justice policy, broad geographies would appear a sensible basis on which to begin to cluster nations within criminology. However, countries can often be seen to belong to more than one

geographic region, and the decision about which region a country belongs to may have a profound effect on the results of an analysis. For instance, Australia could be classified as a member of the New World, the Southern Hemisphere, or Oceania and the nature of the countries with which it is grouped would vary substantially depending on which classification is used. Additionally, while neighbouring countries are often similar, they are not forced to be related in terms of their political or legal systems. This means that clustering countries geographically could lead to groups which are heterogeneous in terms of those factors which may help to explain differences around victimisation, criminal justice policy and attitudes towards crime.

It seems highly plausible that many criminological issues (such as the role of law in day to day life, the definition of criminal behaviour, and expectations for punishment) will be related to a country's legal system. Reflecting this, several authors have classified countries in terms of their legal system and considered how this may be related to different criminological measures (Mukherjee and Reichel, 1999; Nelken, 2000). It is however possible to argue that many issues relating to crime and justice will be influenced by a much wider range of cultural and social factors than will be captured through an exclusive concentration on legal process.

Moving beyond the legal sphere, and reflecting how crime is often seen as a function of wider social, economic, or cultural issues, many pieces of research have classified countries based on their level of socio-economic development (Lewis, 1999; World Health Organisation, 2002). However, as with clustering countries based on their legal tradition, much of this research suffers from developing classifications based on one, or very few, measures meaning that the groups suggested remain heterogeneous in terms of other potentially important explanatory factors.

An alternative approach to classifying countries involves focusing directly on levels of crime or other outcomes of interest. This method commonly involves ranking countries in terms of how they score on a particular issue (for instance, a country's level of imprisonment or homicide rate) and then grouping together countries which appear close together in the resultant distribution (Butchart and Engstrom, 2002; Van Dijk, 2008). The cut-off point for a particular grouping can often appear arbitrary, based either on absolute values, or on a country's position within the distribution (i.e. five clusters may be suggested based on the different quintiles within a distribution). Such an approach can lead to erroneous results, with countries which are actually very similar (in absolute terms) being placed in different clusters.

Two recent pieces of research have considered whether the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), developed to explain differences in welfare policy, is appropriate to explaining differences between countries when studying crime and justice. As outlined further in the following section, there are strong reasons to believe that the cultural and political differences which explain differences in welfare policy may also be important in shaping criminal justice policy and

criminal behaviour. Cavadino and Dignan (2006) consider whether penal policy, and levels of imprisonment in particular, vary systematically across the different types of welfare regimes suggested by Esping-Andersen. They conclude that those countries which have the least inclusive and most individualistic welfare systems also have the most punitive penal systems.

The usefulness of Esping-Andersen's typology for understanding crime and justice is also considered by Smit *et al.* (2008). Their work varies from that of Cavadino and Dignan because it considers many different aspects of crime and justice (victimisation, recorded crime, convictions, prison use amongst others). Considering a sample of 44 countries drawn from North America, Oceania, Western, Central and Eastern Europe and using categorical principal component analysis the authors identify clusters of countries which can be seen as broadly reflecting those suggested by welfare regime research. However, the overlap between the classifications for criminal justice and those concerned with welfare is far from absolute. Most notably, while welfare research often draws a distinction between Scandinavian nations, the countries of Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon nations these were found to represent a single cluster in the work of Smit *et al.*

THE 'FAMILIES OF NATIONS' TYPOLOGY AND THE LINK BETWEEN WELFARE REGIMES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The concept of Families of Nations was first suggested by Castles, Smit and Therborn (Castles, ed., 1993) and subsequently refined by Castles (1998). Considering the twenty-one industrialised nations which are long-term members of the OECD, Castles (1998: pp. 8–9) argues it is possible to identify four distinct groupings of countries (shown in Table 1).

These Families of Nations are 'defined in terms of shared geographical, linguistic, cultural and/or historical attributes [which lead] to distinctive patterns of public policy outcomes' (Castles, 1993: p. xiii). This consideration of historical factors alongside more recent social, economic and political influences marks a distinction between this approach and many of the other typologies developed in social policy. The broader range of issues considered when developing this typology could be expected to make it applicable to a wider range of policy areas compared to those typologies which have been developed with reference to specific areas of welfare policy. Given the expectation that policy mechanisms and outcomes will be influenced by longstanding differences between nations, it is little surprise that there is a strong overlap between the Families of Nations typology and many of the others considered within social policy. For instance, the 'English-Speaking' cluster in Table 1 involves nations which would be classified as liberal welfare regimes in Esping-Andersen's typology. While much existing research using the Families of Nations typology has focused on public policy, the clusters suggested have, not surprisingly, been found to explain individual level social outcomes which

are influenced by historical, cultural, political and economic context. For example, Castles and Flood (1993) show that differences in divorce rates across OECD nations vary in a systematic way across the typology. This lends weight to the expectation that the groupings suggested by the Families of Nations typology may provide a useful starting point for clustering countries based on their populations' responses to the ICVS, even though these responses refer to individual experiences and attitudes rather than criminal justice policy.

TABLE 1
'Families of Nations' Identified by Castles (1998)

English-Speaking Nations	Nordic Nations	Continental Europe	Southern Europe	Countries not Classified
Australia	Denmark	Austria	Greece	Japan
Canada	Finland	Belgium	Portugal	Switzerland
Ireland	Norway	France	Spain	
New Zealand	Sweden	Germany		
United Kingdom		Italy		
USA		Netherlands		

The English-Speaking Family is defined by its historical ties to Great Britain which see these countries share common language, political and legal traditions. There are also substantial cultural similarities between these nations, especially if they are sub-divided into European, New World and Antipodean groupings. With regards to welfare provision these countries are associated with low levels of public expenditure and a strong focus on self-reliance and market mechanisms. In their work considering the applicability of Esping-Andersen's typology to penal policy, Cavadino and Dignan (2006) indicate that this group of nations is associated with high rates of imprisonment. Cavadino and Dignan (2006: pp. 447–448) argue that the link between Neo-Liberal welfare states (as typifies those countries in the 'English-Speaking' family) and crime and justice is two-fold. Firstly, increased levels of inequality and a lack of social cohesion could have a direct effect on criminality and perceptions of justice. Welfare provision provides one way through which individuals can be tied into society and hence provides an effective tool for social control. Where welfare provision is less, these ties are weaker, and the potential benefits from crime may be greater for those who are disadvantaged. Secondly, it is possible that the apparent link between welfare policy and criminological outcomes reflects

more general underlying characteristics. For instance, a focus on individualism may give rise to increasingly harsh attitudes around law and order (Garland, 2001).

In many ways, the Nordic nations can be considered the polar opposite of the English-Speaking cluster. Once again these countries share a common legal tradition and, excepting Finland, have strong linguistic ties. Their close geographical proximity means they have had strong cultural and policy links for a prolonged period of time. These countries generally have universal and generous welfare systems which result in societies which are broadly egalitarian and have low levels of social exclusion. Reflecting the possible links between welfare, crime, and criminal justice policy discussed in the previous paragraph, these nations are exemplified by low rates of imprisonment (Walmsley, 2005) and low public expenditure on maintaining public order (Norris, 2007).

In contrast to the previous two families, those countries which make up the 'Continental Europe' grouping are not linked by shared language. However, they do have a shared history dating back to dynastic times, strong cultural and religious similarities and a high degree of policy transfer amongst themselves (typified by how they were all founder members of the European Community in the mid 1950s). In many ways, the Continental Europe Family would appear to be a middle ground between the two families discussed above. While less universal than in Nordic countries, welfare provision in these nations is more inclusive and generous than in the 'English-Speaking' family. This results in societies which are typified by moderate levels of inequality and citizens having conditional social rights. Similarly, these countries appear to have moderately low levels of imprisonment (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006) and levels of public expenditure on law and order which are below those of the English-Speaking nations (Norris, 2007).

Those countries in the 'Southern European' family share cultural affinities dating back to ancient times and are strongly linked in terms of their late economic, social and political development due to periods of dictatorship in the mid 20th century. Within social policy, it has been argued that these countries represent a sub-group of the Continental Europe Family, distinguished only by their apparent need to 'catch-up' following their late move to democracy (Esping-Andersen, 1997; Katrougalos, 1996). However, accepting the argument that a country's experience of victimisation is often related to its level of economic and social development it seems reasonable to expect that any economic, social or political hang-over from their periods of dictatorship may lead these nations to exhibit unique patterns of victimisation. Similarly, it is possible that more recent experience of dictatorship may lead to individuals holding different views about the role of the police and criminal justice system within society.

Of the remaining two countries, Japan is essentially unique. It is the only country within the typology not to have historical links to Europe. It is geographically distinct from the other countries considered and has a distinctive

language, history and culture. While Japan exhibits high per capital wealth and long-standing democracy, similar to the other countries considered, it has a strong cultural legacy from its links with Asia (Obinger and Wagschal, 2001: p. 100) which has resulted in a distinctive combination of social policies and outcomes. Japan often appears an outlier in terms of crime and justice with noticeably lower levels of crime and imprisonment than other jurisdictions considered in this article. The unique culture of Japan, in particular the focus on harmony, reciprocity and social obligation, is often cited as important in explaining issues around crime and justice (Leonardsen, 2004).

The decision to exclude Switzerland from the clusters identified is much less clear-cut. Castles (1998: p. 9) himself notes that given its history, language and the decentralised nature of its politics a case could be made for including Switzerland in a family of 'German Speaking Nations'. However, much Swiss public policy has deviated from that in the rest of continental Europe, possibly as a result of its highly federalised nature and use of direct democracy (Obinger and Wagschal, 2001: p. 100).

The outlier nature of Japan and Switzerland would appear to be supported by attempts to test the applicability of the Families of Nations typology to welfare policy via cluster analysis. In the work of Obinger and Wagschal (2001) and Castles and Obinger (2008) most countries appeared in clusters which were consistent with the typology outlined in Table 1, and these findings were robust to the use of different time periods and measures of social policy. In contrast, Japan and Switzerland seemed to demonstrate a lack of clarity around where they fit, regularly appearing on the periphery of clusters and switching clusters depending on which data were considered.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIM SURVEY AND THE VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS

The range and scope of research in comparative criminology has been limited by the lack of comparable data. For example, officially recorded crime rates may be influenced, not just by differences in the level of crime but also by variations in the definitions used, citizens' propensity to report crime and the way in which the police record incidents reported to them.

The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), first developed in the late 1980s, is one attempt to overcome the difficulties of using official statistics as a basis for cross-national research. Since the first ICVS in 1989, four subsequent surveys have been conducted, covering not only industrialised countries but also developing nations and the transition nations of Eastern Europe. The most recent ICVS was conducted in 2004/05 and was the first survey to include all the industrialised nations which have proved the mainstay of research in other areas of comparative social policy (shown in Table 1). Therefore, the ICVS now provides data with appropriate coverage to investigate whether the groupings of

countries apparent with reference to other policy areas are also present with regards to individuals' experiences of crime and justice.

The main strengths of the ICVS when comparing across industrialised nations are that for the most part it uses a consistent survey instrument, sampling strategy and method of survey administration in the different jurisdictions it covers. This means that any data collected should be less susceptible to the difficulties which undermine the use of recorded crime statistics for cross-national analysis. With regard to the issues considered in this paper, a further strength of the ICVS is that it covers several other topics beside victimisation. These questions, which cover both attitudinal issues and the practical steps individuals may take to respond to the threat of crime, provide an opportunity to consider whether the 'Families of Nations' typology is appropriate for conceptualising patterns across a range of criminal justice topics. It is however important to note that as the ICVS concentrates on individuals' experience of crime and attitudes towards criminal justice that it is these issues which are the focus of this analysis, rather than a focus on criminal justice policy (for instance the level of resources directed towards policing within a jurisdiction).

There is one salient difference between the sample considered in this article and those which have often been employed to study other areas of social policy. In previous analysis the United Kingdom is typically treated as a single entity (Arts and Gelissen, 2002: pp. 150–151). This reflects how, until recently, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were, in most areas of public policy, subject to a unified legislative process. This is in contrast to criminal justice where marked differences can be seen between legal systems, particularly with regards to Scotland (McAra, 2005; Jones and Christie, 2003). In view of the long-standing differences in legal systems across the United Kingdom, it is by no means certain that it can be considered a single case when attempting to classify nations with regards to criminal justice issues. Indeed, the foundation of the Families of Nations typology, that modern day outcomes are shaped by historical and cultural context, suggests that variations in legal system may well cause differences between nations in terms of modern-day victimisation and justice related attitudes. In view of this, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are treated as separate cases in the subsequent analysis.

Although the ICVS is clearly a valuable data source for comparative criminology, it does have limitations (a good review of the strengths and weaknesses of victim surveys, and the ICVS in particular, is provided by Lynch, 2006). Perhaps the most important issue affecting the use of ICVS data in this research is the relatively small sample size which is employed within each jurisdiction. During the 2004/05 survey, the sample size was typically around 2000 respondents per nation. This sample size could be considered small when compared to the samples in most national crime surveys, and this may affect the reliability of national level estimates. This problem may be particularly acute

when trying to estimate the prevalence of events which are not particularly common, for instance many types of violent crime.

In order to try and address the above concern, where a jurisdiction has taken part in either the 1996 or 2000 ICVS as well as the 2004/05 survey estimates will be averaged across all the sweeps in which that nation has participated. Table 2 provides details of which ICVS sweeps each jurisdiction has taken part in. As not every country has appeared in every sweep, it could be argued that averaging estimates across different time-points could introduce bias to the data. However, a key point of the Families of Nations argument is that the clusters identified represent long-term differences between nations. Therefore, averaging estimates across more than one survey would appear a valid approach because the resultant indicators are more likely to represent the general nature of a jurisdiction, and are less likely to be affected by the results of one unusual set of responses.

Table 3 provides details of the different indicators which will be used in this analysis to represent experiences of victimisation and attitudes towards crime and justice. To try and reduce the possibility that any groupings identified are unduly influenced by any single variable, wherever possible two indicators were used to measure each concept under consideration. For instance, the level of property crime within a country is captured by the aggregate victimisation rate for both burglary and attempted burglary. Similarly, both the incidence rates for robbery and assaults and threats are included as indicators of personal crime.

In addition to the level of victimisation within a country, the dataset includes two indicators of the extent to which respondents worry about crime. Although its exact interpretation is open to question, the percentage of the population who 'feel unsafe when out after dark' in their local area is commonly seen as representing the extent to which people worry about personal, or violent crime (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007: pp. 130–133). The level of worry about burglary should provide an indication as to the level of concern about property crime. Measures concerning whether people install alarm systems or special locks at their home may also be, to some extent, related to the level of concern they have about victimisation. However, it may also be that these indicators provide a measure of whether individuals feel it is necessary to take private precautions to protect themselves from crime. The question concerning the appropriate sentence for a repeat burglar is often used as an indicator of the extent of punitiveness expressed by a population (Mayhew and Van Kesteren, 2002; Van Dijk, 2008). Finally, the extent to which a population believes the police do a good job in controlling local crime is included as a proxy of current satisfaction with public efforts to address criminality.

The extent to which the variables listed in Table 3 accurately reflect the complex nature of a population's attitude towards crime and justice, or experience of crime is open to question. For instance does a question concerning feelings of safety when out after dark capture a respondent's fear of crime or,

TABLE 2
Participation in ICVS Surveys 1996–2004/05

Country	1996	2000	2004/05
Australia		x	x
Austria	x		x
Belgium		x	x
Canada	x	x	x
Denmark		x	x
England and Wales	x	x	x
Finland	x	x	x
France	x	x	x
Germany			x
Greece			x
Ireland			x
Italy			x
Japan		x	x
Netherlands	x	x	x
New Zealand			x
Northern Ireland	x	x	x
Norway			x
Portugal		x	x
Scotland	x	x	x
Spain			x
Sweden	x	x	x
Switzerland	x	x	x
USA	x	x	x

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Indicators Employed in Subsequent Cluster Analysis

Indicator	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Percentage of Respondents who Believe the Police do a Good or Very Good Job Controlling Crime in Their Local Area	63.4	9.1	55.7	84.7
Percentage of Households with a Burglar Alarm	18.9	11.6	4.5	49.0
Percentage of Households with Special Door Locks	48.8	14.4	12.5	72.0
Percentage of Respondents who Prefer a Prison Sentence After Repeated Burglary	30.7	14.4	10.5	53.0
Percentage of Respondents Feeling Unsafe on the Street After Dark	24.7	7.2	14.0	42.0
Percentage of Respondents Thinking a Burglary Next Year is Likely or Very Likely	29.7	10.9	12.0	49.0
Incidence Rate for Burglary (per 100 people)	1.9	0.9	0.6	3.8
Incidence Rate for Attempted Burglary (per 100 people)	1.8	0.9	0.4	3.8
Incidence Rate for Robbery (per 100 people)	0.9	0.5	0.1	2.2
Incidence Rate for Assaults and Threats (per 100 people)	3.7	2.2	0.5	10.1

(n = 23)

may their response, also reflect wider concerns with insecurity? It is also possible to argue that several issues are missing from the topics covered in Table 3. For instance, the scope of the ICVS means that this analysis does not consider experience of drug crime.

HIERARCHICAL CLUSTER ANALYSIS

Cluster analysis has been widely used within social policy to 'test' whether the grouping of nations suggested by theoretical typologies are present when considering real world data (Bambra, 2006; Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Obinger and Wagschal, 2001; Castles and Obinger, 2008). The technique aims to take information about a group of cases (listed in Table 2) measured across a range of dimensions (listed in Table 3) and to group together cases which exhibit similar characteristics while ensuring the maximum amount of heterogeneity between the different clusters identified.

There are numerous different approaches to cluster analysis. These techniques vary in terms of the criteria they use to decide how similar or dissimilar cases are, whether or not they require the researcher to specify the number of clusters they wish to find and the extent to which they allow a case to be a partial member of several clusters (Everitt *et al.*, 2001). The analysis in this paper follows the lead of much of the previous research around welfare regimes by using a hierarchical approach to clustering.

Hierarchical clustering starts with each case being seen as representing a unique cluster. The 'most similar' clusters are then joined together to create a new aggregate cluster. This process is repeated until all cases are joined in a single cluster. Hierarchical methods are particularly suitable for testing the fit between a typology and a dataset because their results are not dependent on the researcher's pre-conceived ideas about how many clusters should be present within the data.

Cluster analysis does not have the strict assumptions of many statistical methods in terms of linearity, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity. However, if each variable involved in the analysis is to have an equal impact on the decision about which cluster a case should be placed in then it is important that all the variables considered are measured using comparable scales. If different variables are measured using different metrics then those indicators which involve larger absolute values may have a disproportionate impact on the results presented. For instance, in this analysis the indicators concerning perceptions of the police and attitudes to punishment would have a greater influence than those concerning victimisation rates. To address this all variables were subject to a z-score transformation prior to the analysis.

Cluster analysis results can vary depending on which algorithm is used to decide which cases or clusters are 'most similar' and should be joined together in the next stage of aggregation. The analysis in this analysis was conducted using the Ward Method, with Squared Euclidean distances employed as the measure of similarity between cases. These choices reflect those which have often been employed in the social policy literature (for instance Obinger and Wagschal, 2001; Castles and Obinger, 2008).

RESULTS

Does the Families of Nations Typology Fit Criminal Justice Attitudes and Victimization?

Analysing the variables described in Table 3 using hierarchical cluster analysis produces the dendrogram shown in Figure 1. A dendrogram provides a graphical representation of the extent of similarity and difference between cases and suggests which cases may be grouped together to create homogeneous clusters. The shorter the length of the line linking together two cases, the more similar they are. For instance, the USA would appear to be very similar to Canada, and Northern Ireland very similar to Scotland, while the group of English-Speaking nations (to the left of Figure 1) would appear highly distinct from the rest of the jurisdictions considered.

The 'English-Speaking' cluster in Figure 1 provides the first, and perhaps most clear-cut, evidence that the groupings identified in the Families of Nations Typology could be related to victimisation levels and attitudes towards criminal justice. Figure 2 suggests how those jurisdictions which make-up the 'English-Speaking' cluster compare to the sample as a whole. The dashed line shows the mean score for each variable across the whole sample, while the solid line indicates the mean score for the 'English-Speaking' jurisdictions. Figure 2 suggests that 'English-Speaking' jurisdictions have higher than average victimisation rates, populations who hold punitive attitudes but are generally happy with the police, and are home to individuals who are likely to invest in protection such as burglar alarms and additional household locks. Despite their apparently increased risk of victimisation, respondents within these jurisdictions do not appear to exhibit an increased fear of crime. The finding that these jurisdictions are characterised by 'poor' outcomes with regards to crime and justice fits with a wider pattern concerning social policy outcomes. This adds weight to the idea that the distinctive cultural, social and political context present within these nations may combine to cause less desirable social outcomes, the so called 'awfulness of the English hypothesis' (Castles and Merrill, 1989; Castles, 1993 and forthcoming).

The characteristics of the 'English-Speaking' cluster add weight to the argument that those countries which appear to have the least generous and inclusive welfare regimes experience less favourable outcomes in the criminal justice sphere. The finding that these jurisdictions are associated with punitive attitudes towards punishment would appear to reflect the findings of Cavadino and Dignan (2006) when discussing penal policy more generally. Combined punitive attitudes with the high levels of victimisation associated with this cluster could be seen as providing some evidence to support the argument that there is something criminogenic about Neo-Liberal welfare regimes. However, as argued above, the discovery that there is a strong overlap between Neo-Liberal approaches to welfare and punitive attitudes or high levels of





Figure 1. Dendrogram Produced Through Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of ICVS Indicators of Victimisation and Attitudes Towards Criminal Justice



English-Speaking Cluster includes Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Ireland, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Scotland and USA


Figure 2. Attributes of the English-Speaking Cluster

victimisation does not provide conclusive evidence that differences in criminal justice outcomes are directly attributable to differences in welfare provision. It is also possible that the apparent tie-up between crime, justice and welfare can be attributed to how both areas reflect general attitudes or characteristics of society. For instance, the strong focus on individual self-sufficiency could provide one explanation why these jurisdictions appear to be associated with individuals who take greater private precautions against the risk of victimisation. That it is not possible to identify definitively which causal mechanisms explain the unfavourable characteristics of the 'English-Speaking' cluster illustrates how while descriptive typologies may be a starting point for understanding and further investigation, they are unlikely to provide complete explanation.

Returning to Figure 1, a second distinct cluster can be identified involving Austria, Finland, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Notably, this cluster involved all four nations which the Families of Nations Typology suggests can be taken together to represent a 'Nordic' family. Figure 3 illustrates that this cluster is characterised by low levels of crime, a low level of concern about crime, less punitive attitudes and possibly less evidence of individuals taking private precautions against crime (the proportion of households purchasing special locks is particularly low). These findings appear to support the argument, made earlier, that the Nordic countries with their high regard for universalism, equality and sense of social cohesion are in many ways the polar opposite of the 'English-Speaking' jurisdictions discussed above.

The remaining clusters, shown in Figure 1, are less distinct than those identified so far. However, they do still appear to fit with the theoretical expectations of the Families of Nations typology. The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France and Belgium group together. While Austria is not present in this cluster, its membership broadly reflects the Continental Europe family suggested by Castles (1998). Similarly, while soon joining with the Continental Europe family, Portugal, Spain and Greece are shown to cluster together, supporting the expectation that their more recent transition to democratic politics and resultant differences in economic and social conditions may be responsible for a distinct pattern of outcomes relating to crime and justice. The characteristics of these two clusters are shown in Figures 4 and 5. The characteristics of the 'Continental Europe' cluster appear unremarkable, broadly following the means for the sample as a whole. This suggests that these nations sit mid way between the 'English-Speaking' and 'Nordic' jurisdictions, a finding which reflects not only the work of Cavadino and Dignan (2006) concerning penal policy, but also the way these nations are perceived in social policy more generally (centrist politics, moderately generous welfare states and differences in terms of income equality which while present are not extreme).

Comparing the characteristics of Greece, Portugal and Spain (Figure 5) with the 'Continental Europe' Family (shown in Figure 4) supports the expectation that these three jurisdictions may form a separate, 'Southern European', family.




Nordic Cluster includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland

Figure 3. Attributes of the Nordic Cluster


While it is important not to overstate the difference between these two groups, for instance they appear very similar in terms of their attitudes towards punishment; there are some clear differences in terms of experience of victimisation, worry about crime and attitudes towards the police. Two points are particularly worthy of note. Firstly, in contrast to the three clusters discussed so far, the Southern European cluster exhibits a marked difference between the level of victimisation (generally low compared to other countries) and the extent to which people worry about crime (high compared to other countries). This suggests that other, wider social or cultural, issues may be influencing the perception of risk in these countries. Secondly, the 'Southern European' family exhibits a lower level of satisfaction with local policing than any of the other clusters identified in this analysis. Once again, this attitude appears at odds with the countries' experiences of victimisation and it seems plausible that wider social or cultural issues may be at play. For instance, it could be the case that attitudes toward the police in these countries are coloured by memories of their relatively recent authoritarian regimes. Attitudes towards law enforcement may therefore reflect wider concerns around the authority of the state or the role of the criminal justice system within society.

Figure 1 suggests Japan does not fit well with any of the other jurisdictions considered in this study (it is the last jurisdiction to cluster together with other cases). This provides evidence that it may indeed be an outlier in terms of the cases considered in this article, a point reinforced by Figure 6. Generally, a



Continental Europe Cluster includes Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands and Italy

Figure 4. Attributes of the Continental Europe Cluster



Southern Europe Cluster includes Greece, Portugal and Spain

Figure 5. Attributes of the Southern Europe Cluster

jurisdiction's scores in terms of punitiveness and worry about crime appear related to levels of victimisation (compare Figures 2–4). In contrast, respondents in Japan appear to hold punitive attitudes and be highly concerned about the risk of victimisation even though the country exhibits very low levels of victimisation. The finding that Japan does not fit with the pattern linking attitudes to victimisation levels may support the argument that Japanese society encompasses a unique set of cultural values which influence the way crime is perceived. For instance, while the public's punitive attitude may not reflect the risk of victimisation, it could be attributable to how the Japanese often see the needs of society as more important than the needs of the individual, and place high importance on the obedience of authority. Those who commit crime can be seen to have broken both of these conventions and hence are viewed in a poor light. This point may be especially pertinent because the ICVS question refers to a 'repeat burglar'; hence the offender has transgressed important social conventions on more than one occasion.

The overlap between the theoretical families (outlined in Table 1) and the clusters identified in Figure 1 is very strong suggesting that the Families of Nations typology is relevant to understanding differences in victimisation and attitudes towards crime and justice. It is important to note that differences in the levels of victimisation and attitudes associated with each family would appear consistent with the expectations outlined earlier, and can be seen as attributable to the differences between families in terms of culture, economy and politics




Figure 6. Attributes of Japan

providing a theoretical explanation of why particular jurisdictions cluster together.

The identification of separate 'English-Speaking', 'Nordic', and 'Continental European' families marks an interesting contrast with the results of Smit *et al.* (2008) where these countries were argued to represent a single cluster. It is not possible to pinpoint the exact reason for this difference; it is most likely a combination of the differences between the two pieces of analysis, for instance the cluster techniques they employ and the indicators they chose to consider. However, perhaps the single most plausible explanation is that the two pieces of research involve very different samples. The sample considered by Smit *et al.* includes not only most of the long-term industrialised democracies considered in this article but, also the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. When considered in this wider context, the criminal justice situation in Scandinavia, Western Europe and North America may appear relatively similar. However, when the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are excluded from the analysis more subtle differences between the remaining nations become apparent¹.

Typologies are likely to be of most use for comparative research when the groupings they suggest are highly internally homogenous, yet distinct from each other. One measure of the extent to which a range of cases are similar is the Coefficient of Variation. This is calculated as the standard deviation of the sample divided by its mean. The smaller a Coefficient of Variation, the greater the similarity between cases. For each of the indicators considered in this analysis, Table 4 shows the Coefficient of Variation for the sample as a whole, and for each of the 'families' suggested by the previous cluster analysis. If the Families of Nations Typology does a good job of explaining the variation between jurisdictions then it should be the case that the Coefficients of Variation for the separate families will be smaller than that for the sample as a whole.

On average, the Coefficients of Variation for the individual 'families' are around 25% lower than those for the sample as a whole (last row of Table 4). However, this finding is not universal across either 'families' or indicators. The mean Coefficient of Variation for the 'English-Speaking' cluster is the lowest in Table 4, reflecting how this cluster is the most distinctive in Figure 1. For each of the remaining 'families' it is possible to identify at least one indicator where the family's Coefficient of Variation is greater than that for the sample as a whole. For instance, Table 4 suggests that the 'Nordic' cluster is generally very homogeneous (several of its Coefficients of Variation are smaller than those associated with the 'English-Speaking' cluster), however members of this cluster appear much less cohesive in terms of their level of burglary, or their use of burglar alarms. Similarly, the 'Continental European' countries appear to vary substantially in terms of their level of robbery and the 'Southern European' nations are particularly varied with regards to their rates of attempted burglary. These results illustrate how, while the Families of Nations typology may

TABLE 4
Coefficients of Variation for Indicators of Victimization and Attitudes Towards Crime and Justice Across Different Families

Indicator	Overall Sample (n = 22)	English-Speaking (n = 8)	Nordic (n = 6)	Continental Europe (n = 5)	Southern Europe (n = 3)
Percentage of Respondents who Believe the Police do a Good or Very Good Job Controlling Crime in Their Local Area	0.13	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.02
Percentage of Households with a Burglar Alarm	0.58	0.30	0.77	0.31	0.27
Percentage of Households with Special Door Locks	0.24	0.14	0.22	0.24	0.02
Percentage of Respondents who Prefer a Prison Sentence After Repeated Burglary	0.47	0.15	0.42	0.37	0.30
Percentage of Respondents Feeling Unsafe on the Street After Dark	0.30	0.18	0.13	0.26	0.17
Percentage of Respondents Thinking a Burglary Next Year is Likely or Very Likely	0.37	0.22	0.28	0.33	0.31
Incidence Rate for Burglary (per 100 people)	0.46	0.27	0.60	0.28	0.38
Incidence Rate for Attempted Burglary (per 100 people)	0.50	0.28	0.35	0.29	0.64
Incidence Rate for Robbery (per 100 people)	0.49	0.43	0.31	0.51	0.14
Incidence Rate for Assaults and Threats (per 100 people)	0.55	0.33	0.22	0.42	0.45
Mean Coefficient of Variation	0.41	0.24	0.31	0.31	0.27

Membership of clusters as described in Figures 2 through 5.

Calculations exclude Japan which appears not to cluster with other nations.

Bold figures show where the coefficient of variation for a given 'family' is greater than that for the overall sample.

provide a useful starting point for summarising and understanding differences around victimisation and attitudes towards justice, there will always be exceptions which do not fit the overall pattern. Identifying those examples which do not fit expectations is likely to provide useful guidance as to where further, more detailed, research should be focused. For instance, why is it that Austria and Switzerland cluster with the Nordic nations rather than associating with the 'Continental Europe' cluster as is suggested by the Families of Nations typology?

Are the Three Jurisdictions in the United Kingdom Really That Different?

This paper concludes with two brief examples of how the grouping of jurisdictions suggested by the Families of Nations approach may help to shed new light on existing questions in comparative criminology. As outlined earlier, the United Kingdom is made up of three separate jurisdictions each of which has a distinct history, legal definitions, and criminal justice practices. Figure 7 suggests that, across the different dimensions considered in this article, there may be some salient differences within the United Kingdom. Most notably, victimisation rates within England and Wales appear higher than those in Scotland or Northern Ireland, while the population of England and Wales also appears to express greater levels of worry with regards to crime. Less stark differences can also be seen when comparing Scotland and Northern Ireland; for instance the victimisation rates for personal crimes appear higher in Scotland than in Northern Ireland. However, Figure 7 also suggests that it is important not to overstate the differences within the UK. This is best illustrated by the responses to those questions concerning attitudes towards the police and punishment where all three jurisdictions provide very similar responses.

The results of the previous cluster analysis (Figure 1) can help to put the apparent differences across the UK in context. The dendrogram suggests that Northern Ireland and Scotland are very similar (they are placed side by side in Figure 1 and fuse together very early in the clustering process). In contrast, England and Wales appears slightly separate but still joins the 'English-Speaking' cluster relatively quickly. This suggests that when considered in the context of differences between other industrialised democracies, the differences between the jurisdictions which make up the UK, at least, concerning the issues considered in this article, may be relatively small. This conclusion does not mean that differences between jurisdictions within the UK are unimportant, or that they should not be treated as separate cases in a comparative analysis. It may however provide a useful perspective in which to discuss the salience of differences within the UK.





Figure 7. Radar Graph Comparing the Attributes of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland

Is the United States an Exceptional Case?

Within popular discourse, the United States is often seen as an exceptional case with regards to crime and justice, typified by high levels of violent crime, high levels of firearms ownership and punitive penal policy. This view of the United States has been widely questioned within the literature (for instance, Marshall, 1996). One important issue is the extent to which the apparent exceptionalism of the United States is attributable to how it is often contrasted with Europe in comparative research. Figure 8 shows that the United States is associated with victimisation rates much in excess of the average of the jurisdictions considered in this article, while its population appears to hold particularly punitive attitudes towards punishment and views their local police in a highly positive light.

However, the unique nature of the United States appears much less obvious if it is compared to those jurisdictions which could also be considered part of the 'English-Speaking' cluster. Notably, victimisation rates for the United States appear broadly similar to other 'English-Speaking' jurisdictions. Similarly, while still appearing highly punitive the extent of American uniqueness appears much less when compared to the other 'English-Speaking' jurisdictions rather than 'average' attitudes across the whole sample. This finding suggests that



Other English-Speaking Nations includes Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Ireland, New Zealand, Northern Ireland and Scotland

Figure 8. Radar Graph Comparing the United States to Other English-Speaking Nations

theoretically developed typologies, which take account of important factors such as economic, political and social links between countries, can provide a useful framework in which to conduct cross-national criminological research.

CONCLUSIONS

From a substantive point of view, the findings of this analysis are hardly surprising. The results suggest that when considering individuals' experience of victimisation and attitudes towards crime and justice, groups of jurisdictions can be identified which reflect the clusters suggested by the Families of Nations typology. The families identified by Castles (1998) can be seen as reflecting underlying differences in history, culture, politics and economics and these are all factors which are likely to influence issues around crime and justice. Notably, the criminological characteristics of the different clusters identified offer support for the argument that there may be a strong relationship between a population's experience of crime, criminal justice concerns and wider social policy issues. However, the analysis presented gives no guidance as to whether the apparent correlation between the criminological issues considered and welfare policies is the result of direct causality (i.e. particular welfare regimes are more criminogenic) or whether the relationship reflects how both policy

areas reflect underlying differences between nations in terms of culture, economics, politics and legal practice.

From a methodological viewpoint, this article serves to illustrate three important points. Firstly, the results presented reflect the growing comparative literature around penal policy in suggesting that those factors which have previously been found to be important in explaining welfare policy and welfare outcome may also be relevant to understanding differences around crime and justice. This opens up the possibility that as comparable data become increasingly available, and cross-national criminology continues to grow, there may be much to be gained from considering the explanations and methods developed in the comparative welfare literature.

Secondly, this work illustrates how the use of a theoretically developed typology (such as the 'Families of Nations') can provide a useful framework in which to conduct cross-national research. Even the limited analysis presented in this article raises several interesting questions worth further investigation. For instance, what is it about the criminal justice situation in Austria and Switzerland which means that their populations' experiences of crime and attitudes towards criminal justice sees them appear in a 'Nordic' cluster rather than in a 'Continental European' family? Similarly, why is it that the jurisdictions which form the 'Nordic' cluster in this analysis appear very similar across most of the dimensions considered but vary substantially in terms of their use of household alarms and level of burglary victimisation? Such deviations from the results suggested by a theoretical typology may help to highlight 'unusual' cases and therefore provide a focus for further research.

Finally, this analysis provides evidence that the results of empirical clustering can be influenced by the data which are considered. For instance, in their analysis with a sample involving a wider range of countries Smit *et al.* (2008) found that the 'Nordic', 'Continental European' and 'English-Speaking' clusters present in this analysis formed a single grouping. This result is most likely attributable to the different samples considered but it is by no means certain that the clusters identified in this analysis will persist across different substantive interest within criminology, or that they will remain constant over time. Indeed, if victimisation and attitudes towards crime are a function of social, economic and political factors then it could be expected that increased globalisation and convergence of social and economic policies will cause shifts in crime and justice to occur.

NOTE

1. Indeed this point is argued by Smit *et al.* (2008: p. 184) when they suggest that a more detailed analysis of those countries which they identify as 'North/West' may help to identify sub-groups within this cluster.

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