

Chechnya: Has Moscow Won?

Roland Dannreuther and Luke March

The issue of Chechnya barely featured in the Russian parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007 and 2008. This was in stark contrast with previous elections in which the Chechen conflict was either an embarrassment to be disguised by propaganda or a recognised failure demanding concrete, decisive new action. In 1996, in order to ensure his electoral victory, Boris Yeltsin was all but forced to negotiate a humiliating agreement with Chechen rebel leaders granting them de facto independence. In 1999–2000, the strategic dangers of Islamist extremism and expansionism emanating from a lawless Chechnya were central to Vladimir Putin's presidential campaign. Moscow's subsequent robust military response conferred the mantle of legitimacy on Putin, who had been almost invisible politically a few months earlier. In 2003–04, Putin sought to present his Chechnya policy as an unqualified success, but this meant downplaying ongoing violence, including increasingly cruel terrorist atrocities committed by rebels, which culminated in the horrors of the Beslan siege in September 2004.

By 2007–08, however, things had changed. Certainly, as in previous elections, Russia's state-controlled media poured forth exaggerated claims of success, but this time even respected political scientists were willing to proclaim that:

the war in Chechnya has ended. We won. The main heroes of this war are its political leaders and also the several thousands of young lads:

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Chechens, Russians and others, who gave their lives for the territorial integrity of Russia, for the security of the citizens of Russia and for the reduction of the threat of terrorism.¹

What is more, there was actually some truth in these claims. Although many problems remain in Chechnya, the situation has greatly improved over the last few years. The Russian security forces have had a string of successes in eliminating the most effective and well-known rebel leaders, including Shamil Basaev in 2006, the charismatic ‘Che Guevara’ of the Chechen resistance. The policy of ‘Chechenisation’, forcefully promoted by Putin to devolve responsibilities from Russian federal forces to local Chechens, has resulted in the consolidation of President Ramzan Kadyrov’s power, and that of his armed formations. Kadyrov might be a brutal ex-bandit, but he has shown sufficient strategic sense and flexibility to win over other former rebels and to gain genuine popular support (albeit mixed with a degree of fear and loathing) from his war-weary population. His public image has also been aided by the fact that substantial federal funds for reconstruction have finally made a marked impact on the ground, and the local economy is showing signs of improvement. The popular appetite for secession has, as a consequence, declined significantly.² Russia’s success in Chechnya, little recognised in the West, is not just important in itself, but in the way it has structured and legitimated the political changes that Putin has introduced during his presidency. Putin’s strategy during the war and the subsequent pacification of Chechnya have helped construct the post-Yeltsin Russian state in a way that has seen the increased centralisation of power and the promotion of authoritarian state structures. Moreover, the policy of ‘Chechenisation’ and the associated empowerment of Ramzan Kadyrov as Russia’s faithful proxy in the North Caucasus, while providing short-term gains, might also have created a political Frankenstein, to use the colourful image of one commentator – Kadyrov’s over-zealous loyalty and eagerness to act as Russia’s proxy in the North Caucasus has raised wider concerns over an unrequited Chechen expansionist agenda.³ Further doubts exist about how replicable the ‘Chechen model’ is in the rest of the North Caucasus, where instability and radicalisation are increasing. Some

question whether the broader legacy of the conflict in Chechnya, and its political instrumentalisation by the Kremlin to promote a more authoritarian and self-assertive nationalist state, might have longer-term damaging consequences, not least for the West's relations with Russia.

Putin's Caucasian 'war on terror'

It is no overestimation to say that the North Caucasus defined and moulded Putin's presidency: his democratic legitimacy was indeed 'forged in war'.⁴ It was in the North Caucasus that Putin's prestige and popularity were initially grounded, and he reaped the rewards of a military campaign that was deemed by most Russians to be both necessary and successful. Remarkably, his popularity never waned, except briefly after the Beslan hostage-taking incident in September 2004. Putin always understood the critical importance of perceptions of victory and success in Russia's 'war on terror' in the North Caucasus, noting as he came to power that 'my mission, my historic mission – it sounds pompous, but it is true – is to resolve the situation in the North Caucasus'.⁵ The fact that in 2007 he and his associates could reasonably declare that victory had been achieved provided a vital source of legitimacy for the distinctly less free and more authoritarian political structures that Putin had constructed in the intervening period.

It is notable that Putin consciously framed his response to the conflict in Chechnya so as to put clear psychological distance between his presidency and that of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. For Putin, the North Caucasus was reflective of the larger problems facing post-Soviet Russia – the threat of disintegration, the perceived penetration and subversion by foreign forces, the weakening of state structures as a result of criminality and terror, and Russia's basic inability to stand up for itself and secure its core national objectives. There is no doubt that Putin, whose background was in the KGB, was deeply offended by the chaotic state of Russia in the late 1990s, of which the North Caucasus was the most flagrant example. Yeltsin's unpopularity at this time reflected broader popular revulsion with the state of the nation. The succession of bomb attacks on apartment blocks in Russian cities in September 1999, which caused over 300 deaths, had a traumatic impact on Russians, not unlike that felt by Americans after the attacks of

11 September 2001.⁶ This provided the ideal strategic moment to respond with decisive action.

There are certain parallels between Putin's response to the 1999 events and the way in which US President George W. Bush used the 11 September attacks to frame a radical strategic shift in US security policy. Like Putin's implicit representation of the Yeltsin period, Bush sought to characterise the Clinton era as one defined by weakness, indecision, pusillanimity and a lack of moral probity. Instead of meekly appeasing Iraq or lobbing an intermittent cruise missile into the country, as Republicans accused Clinton of doing, Bush launched a full-scale invasion as a part of his 'war on terror'.⁷ Putin's 1999 intervention in Chechnya, unlike the earlier Chechen war (1994–96),

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was similarly defined purely as a counter-terrorist operation.⁸ Like the US 'war on terror' that would begin two years later, Russia's second Chechen campaign had new rules of engagement.

First, as a counterpoint to the perceived constant political meddling of politicians in the Yeltsin period, Putin gave the military carte blanche to conduct the war in such a way as to ensure a decisive victory. Compared with the occasionally tragicomic evolution of the first war, the second campaign was far more professional and effective. This helped ease the deep sense of alienation in the Russian military caused by the conviction that politicians had 'pulled the rug from under their feet' and denied them a military victory in the earlier campaign.⁹

Second, the constant mantra of the second war was that there would be no negotiation with the 'terrorists'. Putin resolved any remaining ambiguities on the issue of independence by confirming that it was not open for discussion, and established uncompromising new rules for dealing with major terrorist incidents. During the hostage crises in Budennovsk in 1995 and Kizlyar in 1996, the sight of leading government figures negotiating with hostage-takers, agreeing to their demands and even facilitating their escape presented an image of a Russia abjectly humiliated. When Putin was confronted with similar challenges, most notably the hostage crises in the

Moscow 'Dubrovka' theatre in 2002 and in Beslan in 2004, he brooked no negotiation and was willing to use deadly force (toxic gas in Moscow, flamethrowers in Beslan) to end the sieges, even at the cost of many innocent lives.

A third new rule was that the Chechens were no longer to have the 'oxygen' of media exposure. Unlike in the first war, the international media was given almost no freedom to report on developments in the second. In addition, the Russian government paid little or no attention to international criticisms of their actions. Indeed, Russia's attitude was one of barely disguised contempt, and any criticism was interpreted as further evidence of Western hypocrisy. As Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, memorably put it:

to those who recommend that we launch talks with Maskhadov, I always invite them to start talks with Mullah Omar. It's the same thing. Currently on Chechen territory there are around 1,200 to 1,300 active rebels, uncompromising bandits, with whom you can only have one conversation – their destruction.¹⁰

Probably the most important innovation of Putin's approach to Chechnya was his decision to assume full responsibility for the Chechen campaign. This contrasted with Yeltsin, who habitually sought to devolve responsibility and hide from any unpleasant repercussions emanating from the North Caucasus. It was this decision which, perhaps more than anything else, moulded the popular conception of Putin as a decisive and strong leader. It provided the popular ballast for subsequent decisions made to counter what were perceived as the root causes of anarchy in the region, such as excessive federalisation, the devolution of power and the political prerogatives assumed by the super-rich, resulting in Putin's successive rolling back of regional autonomies and the persecution of the politicised 'oligarchs' by the state and power ministries. (The most famous and notorious of the oligarchs was Boris Berezovsky, whose links to the Chechen separatists made him vulnerable to the claim that he had the blood of innocent Russians on his hands.¹¹) Ultimately, the North Caucasus became the crucible in which

the authoritarian state structures established by Putin were forged. This was made explicit in the aftermath of Beslan, when gubernatorial elections were abolished and the electoral system was centralised in the name of anti-terrorism.¹² Nevertheless, Putin's highly personalised engagement with Chechnya and the North Caucasus was far from risk-free. There was always the possibility that the conflict would not be successfully ended. Indeed, by 2005 the dominant view among independent analysts was that Putin's Chechen policy had been an unmitigated disaster.¹³ While Chechnya was partially subjugated, a succession of deadly mass-casualty terrorist attacks had been unleashed throughout Russia. Similarly, the pacification of Chechnya appeared only to spread the problem of Islamist extremism to the rest of the North Caucasus, and even beyond. Both Western and Russian critics began to talk about a wide-scale 'Islamic threat' to Russia.¹⁴ By the end of 2006, however, such alarmist scenarios had largely faded.¹⁵ The causes of this certainly included some lucky breaks for Russia, of which the killing of both rebel President Aslan Maskhadov in 2005 and Shamil Basaev in 2006 were most notable. The loss of these key rebel leaders undoubtedly depressed the morale of the resistance. Simple war fatigue was also important, as people lost their appetite for secession and increasingly opted for peace and stability. High oil prices and Russia's economic regeneration also played a vital part, providing the funds for reconstruction which were never previously available or which were simply siphoned off. And in 2004 Putin appointed a reasonably competent representative, Dmitry Kozak, to Russia's southern federal district, who succeeded in ousting some of the most corrupt and ineffective leaders of the region and brought some order and transparency, albeit limited, to its clannish, neopatrimonial practices, which had long been the source of much resentment and violence.¹⁶

Finally, Putin's policy of 'Chechenisation' undoubtedly played a significant role in improving Russia's fortunes in the Caucasus. Central to this policy was the devolution of power to Ramzan Kadyrov.

The 'Ramzanisation' of Chechnya

Although Putin strongly supported the use of military force in Chechnya, he became increasingly aware of its limits. The evidence of the previous war

was that military counter-insurgency operations, which inevitably become indiscriminate and cause extensive collateral damage, only exacerbate the situation unless married with a political process and a policy of devolving power and providing 'local ownership' of the political settlement. The problem during the Yeltsin period was that policy oscillated variously between negotiating with the rebels, promoting pro-Russian Chechen leaders who had no popular base, and seeking a purely military solution. In the early part of the second war, Putin faced the opposite problem of potentially too few options, since the military leadership was determined to pursue a purely military strategy. In practice, Putin gave the military free rein until the 2002 Moscow theatre siege, when it became clear that the Russian military lacked the sophisticated counter-terrorist capabilities needed for an efficient military response to a large-scale, mass-casualty terrorist offensive.¹⁷ The only practical alternative was to pursue a political path and localise or de-internationalise the conflict by gaining a genuinely pro-Russian support base within Chechnya. This would require devolving both political and security responsibilities to the Chechens themselves, including those who could be tempted to switch sides from the rebels, a strategy that much of the Russian military opposed.

The choice of Ahmad Kadyrov, the father of Ramzan and former mufti of Chechnya, as the designated pro-Russian leader was astute. Kadyrov had distinguished himself, in comparison to previous 'puppet' leaders promoted by Moscow, by having supported and fought on the rebels' side in the first war. Indeed, it was Kadyrov who as mufti had declared holy war (*gazaawat*) against Russia in 1995.¹⁸ However, he had become disillusioned with the rebel movement as it increasingly fell under the influence of Salafist and extremist Islamic viewpoints, which were antithetical to his more traditionalist and Sufi-influenced religious stance. In June 2000 he was appointed by Putin as the republic's head of administration. Power was more seriously devolved in 2003, when there was a (manipulated) referendum on a new constitution, paving the way for presidential elections in 2004, which confirmed Kadyrov's power. There was also a devolution of security responsibilities, first from the Ministry of Defence to the Federal Security Services (FSB) and then to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

As federal forces declined in numbers, the local armed formations loyal to Ahmad Kadyrov and his clan, under the command of Kadyrov's son Ramzan, were given increasing powers, including control of a number of the informal but lucrative economic resources and markets of the war economy.¹⁹ This process of 'Chechenisation' was nearly derailed by the assassination of Ahmad Kadyrov shortly after the presidential elections in June 2004. But power was retained by the Kadyrov clan, with Ramzan becoming de facto strongman of the republic despite the election of a new president, Alu Alkhanov. In 2007, even this partial balancing was removed by Putin's decision to force Alkhanov's resignation and promote Ramzan to the presidency. As one commentator put it, 'Chechenisation' had become

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in practice 'Ramzanisation'.²⁰ What has this process of 'Ramzanisation' achieved? First, it has been a key point in the narrative of progress and success that has been critical to Putin's consolidation of power. By the time of the 2007–08 elections, Chechnya was consistently presented as a rosy reconstruction site, with official websites such as www.chechnyatoday.com highlighting the miraculous rebuilding of the Chechen capital Grozny under a benevolent Ramzan,

and even touting its viability as a tourist destination. Moreover, Ramzan has enjoyed a 'younger son' personality cult analogous to that surrounding the more senior and paternal Putin. Given Ramzan's background, this is an impressive example of what is called 'political technology' in Russia and 'public relations' elsewhere. But Kadyrov is proving to be a more effective and capable leader than his unprepossessing exterior might suggest. The sources of his power certainly include brutality and repression, involving a pervasive recourse to torture, and Chechnya's reconstruction has a definite Potemkin-village element. But unlike earlier Russian-proxy leaders, Ramzan has been reasonably efficient in getting insurgents to switch sides by striking the necessary balance between inducements (encouraging insurgents to join his security forces, the so-called *kadyrovtsy*, and benefit from the associated spoils) and threats (to insurgents' families). Along with the general demoralisation of the resistance, particularly due to the assas-

sinations of Maskhadov and Basaev, this has markedly reduced the levels of insecurity within the republic.

Russia's faithful client?

There are clear dangers for Moscow, however, in nurturing this enthusiastic proxy in the North Caucasus. The first is that this devolution of power could result in Moscow ultimately losing its influence in the region. Senior figures in Putin's administration, including Dmitry Kozak and Igor Sechin, Putin's deputy chief of staff, have privately recommended replacing Kadyrov and have expressed fear that he might be accumulating too much power.²¹ Many *siloviki* (security-forces officials), including FSB head Nikolai Patrushev, are concerned that 'Chechenisation' represents a victory for the rebels, a way of gaining independence through intimating loyalty rather than pursuing rebellion. Traditionally, the Russian security services have sought to prevent such concentrations of local power by classic tactics of divide and rule. In Chechnya, this policy is evident in the two pro-Russian Chechen battalions, *Zapad* and *Vostok*, which are under the control of Chechen family-clans independent of Kadyrov. However, Kadyrov is waging a skilful and relentless campaign to consolidate power and undermine alternative Chechen and federal centres of power. A favoured tactic is to claim that non-Chechen security groups like the *Vostok* battalion (controlled by the Yamadaev brothers), or the notorious investigation unit of the Russian interior-ministry forces, are responsible for human-rights violations and should therefore be disbanded.²² Assassination and other violent measures supplement these softer tactics. As one Russian commentator has remarked, for Kadyrov, 'the same methods are used for dealing with enemies, fighting with arms, as for unarmed political opponents'.²³ Relations between federal forces in Chechnya and Ramzan's *kadyrovtsy* are understandably hostile. At the same time, Kadyrov is locked in a long-standing dispute with Moscow over the distribution of the revenues from Chechen oil and the location of oil refineries.²⁴

Putin's judgement, supported by influential presidential-administration deputy head Vladimir Surkov, was that Chechnya needed a strongman, that Kadyrov filled this requirement, and that the neopatrimonial and personal

links between Putin and Kadyrov would ensure his fidelity. Whether this will remain the case under Medvedev's presidency, and whether intra-Chechen resistance to his centralisation can be contained, are open questions. In April 2008, a large-scale gun battle between forces loyal to Kadyrov and the Yamadaev brothers reportedly resulted in 18 dead.²⁵ And Medvedev allegedly shares with Kozak a distaste for lawless despots. However, Medvedev's warm words to Kadyrov on their first official meeting indicated that Moscow still needs Ramzan, at least for the short term. Ramzan, in turn, has been obsequiously loyal to his Moscow patrons, emphasising that Chechnya's successes result both from Russian and Chechen joint efforts, and Putin's personal input.²⁶ But even if he remains loyal, Kadyrov

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still presents a challenge. The key question is whether his clearly expansive ambitions will be satisfied with the territorial limits of the Chechen Republic. The significant resources, both economic and military, which have been dispersed to Chechnya have created a sense that Grozny is becoming the new centre of Russian power in the North Caucasus. There is also a strong belief amongst many Chechens of the legitimacy of a 'Greater Chechnya'. This would incorporate both Dagestan, another Muslim territory that

would provide a strategic link to the sea, and Ingushetia, which shares with Chechnya a *Vainakh* heritage, a history of unity during the Soviet period, and a recognition that a combined Chechen–Ingush political force might be better able to resolve the dispute over the Prigorodnyi district in North Ossetia to the advantage of the Ingush. Shamil Basaev, the charismatic Chechen rebel leader, was unabashedly forthcoming about such Chechen ambitions, casting them as an Islamic ideal: 'we are fighting for the proclamation of an Islamic empire and the establishment of a greater Chechen empire in Chechnya, Dagestan and later Ingushetia'.²⁷ It was not surprising that Kadyrov raised regional hackles when he confirmed that Chechnya's security and law-enforcement agencies were ready to offer whatever help they could to their 'brothers' in Ingushetia, and both Dagestan and Ingushetia have vocally rejected Ramzan's advances. Still, Kadyrov has not hesitated to

intervene further afield: the Chechen president has 25 official representatives in Russia's regions.²⁸ However, Ramzan's forays outside domestic politics (such as his closure of the Danish Refugee Council in retaliation for the publication in Denmark of controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad), were viewed in Moscow as exceeding his authority.²⁹ Many in the liberal intelligentsia remain convinced that Ramzan was involved in the murder of the investigative journalist Anna Politovskaya, one of the most vocal critics of his rule.

Russia: the consequences of success

Russian policies towards Chechnya have succeeded, far more than is generally acknowledged outside Russia, in many of their aims. The republic is now relatively calm, is gradually being rebuilt, and is a loyal member of the Russian Federation. Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov, although a divisive figure, has succeeded in presenting himself as Russia's most faithful servant in the North Caucasus. Chechnya has ceased to be the constant thorn in Russia's soft underbelly that it was following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, the longer-term legacy and consequences of Russia's struggle to reassert sovereignty over Chechnya are not easily predicted. Moscow now finds itself in the curious position of depending on its own appointed proxy for one of its few regional success stories. Moreover, this proxy seems poised to cause trouble for Medvedev. Kadyrov's interventions in regional and even federal policies have done little to smooth relations, while the overspill of the Chechen conflict has contributed to wider regional destabilisation. Whether the Kremlin is capable of removing Kadyrov – assuming it even wants, or dares, to – without reigniting conflict within Chechnya may be doubted, even if he inspires deep distaste in some governing circles.

Elsewhere in the North Caucasus, the 'Chechen model' has not proved easily exportable. The problem with the model is that it depends critically on the effectiveness and capacities of those allies promoted by Moscow and on their ability to recreate Kadyrov's combination of autonomy, local support, guile and sheer brutality. The situation in neighbouring Ingushetia is evidence of the model's limitations: the Kremlin-backed leader, Murat

Zyazikov, is undoubtedly loyal, but is widely viewed as corrupt and weak and lacks local-elite backing. He has struggled to contain the increasing instability and radicalisation within the republic. Despite attempts by regional leaders like Kozak to remove Zyazikov, Putin's personal patronage never wavered, suggesting that Moscow prefers loyalty to effectiveness. This is a risky preference as Moscow increasingly faces an Islamist opposition throughout the North Caucasus which is ever more dispersed, decentralised and uncontrollable, and which has significant mobilisation potential through the exploitation of local dissatisfaction with the lack of socio-economic and political opportunities.

Against this background, Putin's attempts to use the crises in the North Caucasus to stir up nationalism and reinforce the consolidation of power creates a more diffuse but perhaps an even more intractable set of problems. Not only does increased nationalism raise barriers to the greater integration of Muslim communities within Russia, a focus on external threats and a call for national unity against territorial disintegration denies Russia a sufficiently flexible platform from which to engage with many of the direct causes of its Caucasian headaches, principally issues of political governance and representation. Moreover, the promotion of a defensive nationalist mindset, which interprets local difficulties as proceeding from the deliberate designs of hostile foreign forces, has bred an anti-Western popular sentiment that has made Russia's engagement with its neighbours, such as Ukraine and Georgia, and with the West more generally, considerably more antagonistic and hostile. It is an open question how far Medvedev, whose general outlook appears to be more moderate and more pro-Western, will be able to reign in the forces of nationalism that Putin has unleashed, assuming he even has the autonomy and power to do so.

Moscow currently has two alternatives in the North Caucasus. The first is to appoint several Kadyrov-like strongmen with license to govern their republics autonomously and autocratically. This option offers the prospect of regional pacification but comes with the dangers of increasing corruption and poor governance, consolidating the de facto separation of the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation, driving opposition underground and potentially reigniting terrorist campaigns beyond the region. However,

even were the Kremlin to find leaders with the right ‘qualities’, experiences with Kadyrov are unlikely to convince notoriously control-hungry Kremlin elites to contemplate ‘Chechenisation’ on a wider scale. Nevertheless, the obvious alternative, greater regional devolution, transparency and democracy is, unless there is a quite astonishing volte-face under Medvedev, off the agenda for the foreseeable future. This leaves the Kremlin with the (quite possibly forlorn) hope that its current policies of ever greater regional subsidies and military presence combined with the occasional rotation of regional cadres will placate the region and not further exacerbate both elite and military corruption and local grievances, as they have so often done in the past.

Notes

- 1 Sergei Markov, ‘Zadachi Ramzana Kadyrova’, *Izvestiya*, 19 March 2007.
- 2 For an overview of these developments see Anna Matveeva, ‘Chechnya: Dynamics of War and Peace’, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 54, no. 3, November–December 2007, pp. 3–17. For a more critical account, see James Hughes, ‘The Peace Process in Chechnya’, in Richard Sakwa (ed.), *Chechnya: From Past to Future* (London: Anthem Press, 2005).
- 3 Pavel K. Baev, ‘Has Russia Achieved a Victory in its War against Terror?’, *PONARS Policy Memo*, no. 415, December 2006, p. 1.
- 4 Peter Rutland, ‘Putin’s Path to Power’, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 16, no. 4, December 2000, p. 326.
- 5 Quoted in Natalia Gevorkian, A.V. Kolesnikov and Natalia Timakova, *Ot pervogo litsa* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), p. 133.
- 6 For accounts of the impact of the Russian attacks, see Dmitri V. Trenin and Aleksei V. Malashenko, *Russia’s Restless Frontier: the Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 37; and John Russell, ‘Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens before and since 9/11’, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2005, p. 109.
- 7 This became doctrinally encoded in the US National Security Strategy of 2002. For the text of the strategy and commentary on this, see Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (eds), *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- 8 Pavel K. Baev, ‘Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin’s Russia’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 27, no. 4, April 2004, pp. 337–8.
- 9 For an interesting memoir containing reflections on this from one of the leading Russian generals, see G. Troshev, *Moya Voina: chechenskii*

- dnevnik okopnogo generala* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000).
- 10 'Interview with Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation', Agence France Presse, 16 July 2003. For a good general assessment of Russia's Chechnya discourse, see Edwin Bacon and Bettina Renz, *Securitising Russia: The Domestic Policies of Putin* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), ch. 3.
 - 11 For an evaluation of the claim that Berezovskii was lobbying for separatist Chechen interests see Trenin and Malashenko, 'Russia's Restless Frontier', p. 23. Berezovskii is now based in London and the British government's refusal to extradite him is one of the main causes of UK–Russian diplomatic hostility.
 - 12 Dov Lynch, 'The Enemy at the Gate', Russia after Beslan', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 1, January 2005, pp. 141–61.
 - 13 See, for example, John P. Dunlop and Rajan Menon, 'Chaos in the North Caucasus and Russia's Future', *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 97–114; Mark Kramer, 'Instability in the North Caucasus and the Political Implications for the Russian–Chechen War', *PONARS Policy Memo*, no. 380, December 2005.
 - 14 See, for example, Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Mikhail Deliagin, *Rossii posle Putina: Neizbezhna li v Rossii 'oranzhevo-zelenaia' revoliutsiia?* (Moscow: Veche, 2005); and I.V. Zhuravlev, S. A. Mel'kov and L.I. Shershnev, *Put' vionov Allakha: Islam i politika Rossii* (Moscow: Reche, 2004).
 - 15 See, for example, Brian D. Taylor, 'Putin's "Historic Mission": State-Building and the Power Ministries in the North Caucasus', *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 54, no. 6, November–December 2006, pp. 3–16; and the markedly more optimistic report (compared to the one provided at end of 2005) in Mark Kramer, 'The Changing Context of Russian Federal Policy in the North Caucasus', *PONARS Policy Memo*, no. 416, December 2006.
 - 16 For the best account of neopatrimonial structures of power in the North Caucasus, see Georgi M. Deluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2003).
 - 17 Pavel K. Baev, 'Chechnya and the Russian Military: A War too Far?', in Richard Sakwa, *Chechnya: From Past to Future* (London: Anthem Press, 2005), p. 123.
 - 18 John Russell, *Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror'* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 59.
 - 19 For a discussion of how taking over these markets involved clashes with federal military and interior forces, see Aleksandr Kots and Andrei Rodkin, 'The Ambush', *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 3 March 2003.
 - 20 Baev, 'Has Russia Achieved a Victory in its War against Terror?', p. 2.
 - 21 Kramer, 'The Changing Context of Russian Federal Policy', p. 4.
 - 22 Andrei Smirnov, 'Ramzan Kadyrov Targets the Yamadaev Brothers', *Chechnya Weekly*, 13 March 2008.
 - 23 Vadim Rechkalov, 'Real'nyi portret Ramzana Kadyrova', *Moskovskii Komsomlets*, 24–29 January 2007.

- ²⁴ Interview with Ramzan Kadyrov, *Izvestiya*, 13 July 2007.
- ²⁵ Andrei Smirnov, 'Yamadaev vs Kadyrov: The Kremlin's Quandary with Chechnya', *Chechnya Weekly*, 17 April 2008.
- ²⁶ *Interv'yu Prezidenta Chechenskoj Respubliki R. A. Kadyrova telekanalu 'Russia Today'*, 1 February 2008, <http://www.ramzan-kadyrov.ru/smi.php>.
- ²⁷ *Al-Aman*, 17 September 1999, quoted in Domitilla Sagramoso, 'Violence and Conflict in the Russian North Caucasus', *International Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 4, July 2007, p. 697.
- ²⁸ N.S. Nukhazhiev, 'Speech at Conference Dedicated to the First Anniversary of R.A. Kadyrov's Accession to the Presidency of the Chechen Republic', www.chechenombudsman.ru/info/8.htm.
- ²⁹ 'Kadyrov, Ramzan', Lenta.ru Lentapedia, <http://www.lenta.ru/lib/14161090/full.htm>, 18 January 2008.

