Ashley Taylor, "Solidarity: Obligations and Expressions"

In some instances of solidarity individuals act with a group as a result of obligations incurred because of membership in that group. In other instances, individuals act in solidarity to express empathy or support for a group in which they have never actually participated, and whom they could not possibly be considered to be acting with. Our options are to either accept the mutual exclusivity of these two dominant uses of the term; reject one of these views of solidarity; or to find a way of explaining that in fact both solidarity with a group and solidarity toward a group are instances of solidarity. This paper takes the latter route. After clarifying the different normative uses of solidarity along the lines of expressional and robust solidarity, I offer an account of the necessary conditions of solidarity. I then argue that the difference in the normative content of these two species of solidarity depends on whether the conditions of solidarity are bidirectional or unidirectional.

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